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ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE THE ERROR COMPLAINED OF IN
THIS APPEAL AND THE INSUFFICIENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
REGARDING WITNESS TAMPERING RESULTED IN MANIFEST
INJUSTICE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR.

The State attempts to color Appellant's attempts to request a review of the jury
instructions as "fatally flawed" because the Appellant "actually proposed an elements
instruction containing the very omission he now complains of on appeal." Br. Appellee at 11.
Appellant concedes State v. Perdue and its progeny clearly stand for the proposition that
"where invited error buts up against manifest injustice, the invited error rule prevails." 813
P.2d 1202, 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, the situation at issue here, and the position
of the Appellant, deals not simply with the instructions provided, but rather, with the exclusion
of additional instructions, which are critical to the determination of the jury as to the
culpability of the Appellant. By framing the critical issue as an invited error situation, the
State attempts to paint Appellant into a corner, such that under no circumstances could a set of
jury instructions be considered on appeal if they were not first objected to at trial. This is
clearly not what the legislature had in mind when it fashioned the language of Utah R. Crim.
P. 19(c). While the State has cited a line of cases that seems to stand for the position that
failure to object to a particular jury instruction seemingly forecloses any possibility of judicial
review, such a legal anomaly cannot stand in light of the plain statutory language of Rule
19(c). What the State has failed to recognize and respond to, however, is the actual issue
under review here—not that the instruction given with regard to witness tampering failed to
accurately reflect the language of the law, but rather that the failure of the court to provide
additional information with regard to the mens rea required to convict appellant of the crime of

witness tampering was lacking, rendering the jury instructions, as a whole, inadequate and
resulting in manifest injustice. Consequently, it cannot be said that Appellant invited the error
just because the instruction he proposed recited correct statutory language. Thus, the failure of
trial counsel to object to the lack of a mens rea instruction, while bolstering Appellant's claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, does not serve to deny Appellant of the protections of a
manifest error review under the trump of the invited error rule.
The State concedes that the jury was not instructed on the mental state required to
convict appellant of attempting to induce a person to perform any of the enumerated acts under
the statute. Br. Appellee at 10. This, in fact, is the crux of Appellant's claim of manifest
injustice regarding the court's instruction as to the elements of witness tampering. The failure
of trial counsel to offer a mens rea instruction does not change the fact that the instructions
given to the jury failed to instruct as to the mens rea requirement of attempting to induce
Airman Lyon to perform any of the enumerated acts. Likewise, the State concedes, "to avoid
manifest injustice, an elements instruction that fails to include the mens rea constitutes
reversible error." Br. Appellee at 11 (quoting State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, f 54, 989
P.2d 1091). The language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508, witness tampering, does not contain
a mens rea requirement with regard to attempting to induce the enumerated acts, triggering, as
the State further concedes, the application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102, which provides in
pertinent part, "when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state and
the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to
establish criminal responsibility. However, nowhere in the jury instructions is this statute cited
or referred to in any way. While Utah courts have generally recognized a knowledge or intent
requirement with regard to the appropriate mental state in terms of attempting to induce the

em lmerated acts, the jury instructions at issue are silent to any mens rea reqi lirement

v w n ^ v_t. A p p . 1989).

S ?e

T h u s , the m e m b e r s of the j u r y were left \* \\.ut guidance a-, u

Le

impropriate mens rea, and w e r e free to apply whatever degree oi v - , . r ^ i , i v ..A . .-.
is* -

^elieence. This failure to properly instruct the

jury w ith regard to each and every element of the crime charged was in e r r c : and resulted in
manifest injustice

Review of such error is not precludes ;

..

,

- ..

:--..

(icfnitliHiiiii ill I HOI j|!iopoM" in u n n i o u k ;in instruction that misinformed the jury as to the
language wt the statute
jury's daiMit,

..

Because the trial court failed \
*.:,.w....,i..

^uli,iw.!«-

,-; o e r h i.^iruct the j u r y , bringing the

,.'.:..

..

.

.

H4.

diss i ATEMENTS OF THE LAW FOUND IN THE J I J RY
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING FALSE STATEMENT V \ ERE NOT
HARMLESS AND CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR.
T h e State concedes that the trial :• :)i irt " 'ei red in insei ting tl le phrase 'oi can lsed to be
made

mtu instruction 3 0 . " Br. Appellee at 17. H o w e v e r , the State contends this error is

" h a r m l e s s " because this court could determine from the record that the j u r y found all the
elements oi the old use

in" a1 ' ' -. " i".

- null* h

. • I1 • Slate

"d

K

i^crcis.' i

lexicology fails to recognize that Utah Code A n n . § 76-8-504(2)(a) and (2)(c) are discreet
offenses which require different levels of culpability and deal with dillerent actions

As such,

language "poses a p r o b l e m only if it
would have permitted the jury to convict based on conduci and a mental ^tate criminalized by
neither 2(a) nor 2(c) secuun /O ,N ;>;-,

i.iv correct anai\M. .

si,! i lih ,i as to ht • si it 'Si II i: led by ei t.el I other

* i.

,

. . ' ' *•

e

* >

negating the need to determine if a conviciion undci

one subsection would suffice to c o m ici under the othei

The plain language of the statute

makes it clear that this is not the case. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 (2)(a) deals solely with
written false statements made by the defendant, while section 76-8-504 (2)(c) could be a
writing written by anyone upon which the defendant invited reliance. Prior to addressing the
critical difference between the two subsection, that being the different levels of culpability, it is
important to note that truth and authenticity are not interchangeable terms in "common, daily,
nontechnical speech." While the dictionary definitions of "true" and "authentic" are similar,
in common parlance, and in terms of written documents, such terms are dissimilar. As used in
the statute, making a written statement one does not believe to be true goes to the content of
document. An authentic document, on the other hand, is a truthful document in the sense that
the document is not a forgery, and it is true as to the representations made with regard to the
origin of the document.

Were there not this semantic difference between the two subsections,

subsection 2(a) would be superfluous as its meaning would be entirely subsumed by the
language of subsection 2(c). Thus, the addition of the phrase "or caused to be made" to the
language of Instruction 30 2(a) fundamentally changes the nature of the violation charged such
that the jury's determination is suspect.
As noted above, however, the critical error in Instruction 30 is the failure to instruct the
jury with regard to the varying degrees of culpability between the two subsections. To convict
under subsection 2(a) the jury need to find only that the defendant believed the written
statement to be untrue. On the other hand, to convict under subsection 2(c), the jury must find
that the defendant knew the document to be lacking in authenticity. Once again, failure to
instruct the jury as to all the elements of the crime, including the required mens rea, under
each of these two discreet subsections constitutes manifest injustice and reversible error. See
State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608-09 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d

352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The State cites to State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1984) to support the position that failure to define the term knowingly was harmless error.
However, the facts of Fontana are distinguishable and do not serve to support this position. In
Fontana, the jury was instructed with regard to three alternate forms of conduct under which
the defendant could be convicted of second-degree murder. 680 P.2d at 1044. The jury was
then provided with detailed definitions of the meanings of these terms. Id. The defendant in
Fontana took issue to the definition of the term "depraved indifference" as described in the
definitions. Id. The Court held that although the definition of depraved indifference may have
been incorrect, there was sufficient evidence to convict under one of the other forms of mens
rea defined in the instructions. Id. at 1048. As a result the error was deemed harmless. Id. at
1049. Conversely, the jury instructions at issue here contain no definition of knowingly or with
knowledge and no explanation of the difference between knowing and believing. Thus, unlike
the results in the Fontana case, it is impossible to determine upon what basis the jury was
making a determination of guilt. It may be that the jury decided that Appellant caused to be
made a false written statement that he believed was not true, under which case the jury's
verdict was based on an incorrect definition of the law and manifest error results. Or it may be
that the jury determined that Appellant invited reliance on a document which he knew to be
lacking in authenticity, however, because the jury was not instructed with regard to the mens
rea standard of knowingly or with knowledge, the instructions are fatally flawed. Regardless
of the basis for the jury's decision, because of the errors in Instruction 30 this court cannot
determine whether the jury found each required element and reversal is required. See State v.
Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980). In sum, Instruction 30 is inaccurate and over inclusive.
The failure of the trial court to accurately instruct the jury as to the elements of the crime

charged was not harmless, but rather, resulted in manifest injustice which denied Appellant his
right to a fair trial.
III.

TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE
STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS AND AS A RESULT THE
OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL WAS PREJUDICED.

As established through Appellant's Briefs, the deficient and inaccurate jury instructions
resulted in manifest injustice and prejudice to Appellant. This prejudice to Appellant is
directly attributable to trial counsel's failure to object to the proposed instructions or provide
fully explanatory instructions with regard to mens rea requirements of the various charged
offenses. Because the inaccurate and incomplete jury instructions resulted in manifest injustice
to Appellant, trial counsel's failure to object satisfies the prejudice prong of the Strickland v.
Washington test such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 466 U.S. 668
at 694 (1984). Strickland's prejudice prong is comparable to the standard used by Utah courts
in determining the second prong of the manifest error test. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
124, n. 15 (Utah 1989). Therefore, because Appellant has established manifest injustice from
the erroneous jury instructions, trial counsel's failure to object to or provide correct alternative
instructions likewise resulted in sufficient prejudice to meet the second prong of the Strickland
test.
Regardless of the prejudice to Appellant, the State claims that the trial counsel's
performance does not fall below the reasonable performance standards, as required by the first
prong of the Strickland test. An examination of the factors cited by the State, however, shows
that the State has failed to accurately identify and address the issue at stake. The State
describes trial counsel's strategy as one where "the mental state of the offense was

immaterial." Br. Appellee at 19. In other words, "defendant did not admit the conduct
(inducing Lyon to inform falsely), but deny the mental state (knowingly); he denied the
conduct. The mental state was therefore immaterial." Id, The States reasoning is faulty,
however, based on the position described by Appellant's testimony and those testifying on his
behalf.
The position of Appellant through trial and this appeal is that while he did ask Airman
Lyons to provide a statement (the actus red), he did not knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly
ask Lyons to provide a false statement (the mens red). It is this intent that is the focal point of
the Appellant's case. As such, it was incumbent on trial counsel to establish the mental state of
Appellant in asking Airman Lyons to provide the statement. When Airman Lyons testified that
the statement was false, trial counsel attempted to discredit Airman Lyons' statements to this
effect as a way to establish Appellant's state of mind. This was done because the very issue
was not only whether the statement was false, but also did Appellant know it was false. Yet,
even with the apparent trial strategy of trial counsel to establish that Appellant did not know
the statement was false, because in fact he believed it to be true, counsel failed to object to a
set of jury instructions which failed to properly instruct the jury as to the mens rea element
required for conviction of the charged offenses. Where trial counsel apparently developed a
trial strategy intended to establish that Appellant's actions lacked the level of culpability to
sustain a conviction, only to fail to ensure that the jury was properly instructed as to the
necessary culpability, trial counsel's performance fell below the "standard of reasonable
professional assistance . . . under all attendant circumstances." State v. Parker, 4 P.3d 778,
781-82 (citations omitted). In essence, trial counsel's failure to object to the proposed jury
instructions made it impossible for the jury to reach a competent decision and manifest error

resulted. Thus, with regard to the jury instructions, Appellant's claims of ineffective
assistance are not, as the State has suggested, subsumed by his claim of manifest injustice
through the jury instructions. Rather, counsel's ineffective representation resulted in a
situation where the improper jury instructions could only be cured through a showing of
manifest, rather than plain, error, exacerbating an already prejudicial situation for Appellant.
Thus, trial counsel's complicity in presenting the jury with inaccurate and incomplete jury
instructions meets both prongs of the Strickland test, establishing the fact that Appellant was
denied his right to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse the
convictions of the lower court and remand for a new trial.
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